Charmides
by
Plato
Charmides
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[2] PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator, Charmides,
[3] Chaerephon, Critias.
[4]
[5] SCENE: The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of the King
[6] Archon.
[7]
[8] Yesterday evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a
[9] good while away, I thought that I should like to go and look at my old
[10] haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the
[11] temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found a number
[12] of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and
[13] no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all
[14] sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me,
[15] seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates?--(I should
[16] explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we
[17] came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.)
[18]
[19] You see, I replied, that here I am.
[20]
[21] There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and that
[22] many of our acquaintance had fallen.
[23]
[24] That, I replied, was not far from the truth.
[25]
[26] I suppose, he said, that you were present.
[27]
[28] I was.
[29]
[30] Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only heard
[31] imperfectly.
[32]
[33] I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Critias the son of
[34] Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him and the rest of the company, I
[35] told them the news from the army, and answered their several enquiries.
[36]
[37] Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make
[38] enquiries about matters at home--about the present state of philosophy, and
[39] about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or
[40] beauty, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, invited my attention to
[41] some youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to one another,
[42] followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he said, I fancy that you
[43] will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are
[44] the advanced guard of the great beauty, as he is thought to be, of the day,
[45] and he is likely to be not far off himself.
[46]
[47] Who is he, I said; and who is his father?
[48]
[49] Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my
[50] uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him too, although he was not
[51] grown up at the time of your departure.
[52]
[53] Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was
[54] still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be almost a
[55] young man.
[56]
[57] You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he is
[58] like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered.
[59]
[60] Now you know, my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the
[61] beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for
[62] almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that
[63] moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished at
[64] his beauty and stature; all the world seemed to be enamoured of him;
[65] amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers
[66] followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected
[67] in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same
[68] feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, turned
[69] and looked at him, as if he had been a statue.
[70]
[71] Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has he
[72] not a beautiful face?
[73]
[74] Most beautiful, I said.
[75]
[76] But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see his
[77] naked form: he is absolutely perfect.
[78]
[79] And to this they all agreed.
[80]
[81] By Heracles, I said, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one
[82] other slight addition.
[83]
[84] What is that? said Critias.
[85]
[86] If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be
[87] expected to have this.
[88]
[89] He is as fair and good within, as he is without, replied Critias.
[90]
[91] Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul,
[92] naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to talk.
[93]
[94] That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher
[95] already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in
[96] that of others.
[97]
[98] That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been in
[99] your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not call
[100] him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, there
[101] could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of you, who
[102] are his guardian and cousin.
[103]
[104] Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turning to the attendant, he
[105] said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a
[106] physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before
[107] yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining
[108] lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should
[109] you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache?
[110]
[111] Why not, I said; but will he come?
[112]
[113] He will be sure to come, he replied.
[114]
[115] He came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great
[116] amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his
[117] neighbour in order to make a place for him next to themselves, until at the
[118] two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over
[119] sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former bold
[120] belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when Critias
[121] told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me in such an
[122] indescribable manner, and was just going to ask a question. And at that
[123] moment all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and, O rare! I
[124] caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I
[125] could no longer contain myself. I thought how well Cydias understood the
[126] nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some one 'not
[127] to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him,' for I
[128] felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite. But I
[129] controlled myself, and when he asked me if I knew the cure of the headache,
[130] I answered, but with an effort, that I did know.
[131]
[132] And what is it? he said.
[133]
[134] I replied that it was a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by a
[135] charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used
[136] the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm the leaf would
[137] be of no avail.
[138]
[139] Then I will write out the charm from your dictation, he said.
[140]
[141] With my consent? I said, or without my consent?
[142]
[143] With your consent, Socrates, he said, laughing.
[144]
[145] Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name?
[146]
[147] I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about you
[148] among my companions; and I remember when I was a child seeing you in
[149] company with my cousin Critias.
[150]
[151] I am glad to find that you remember me, I said; for I shall now be more at
[152] home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the charm,
[153] about which I felt a difficulty before. For the charm will do more,
[154] Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you have heard
[155] eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that
[156] they cannot cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be
[157] cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that to think of
[158] curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of
[159] folly. And arguing in this way they apply their methods to the whole body,
[160] and try to treat and heal the whole and the part together. Did you ever
[161] observe that this is what they say?
[162]
[163] Yes, he said.
[164]
[165] And they are right, and you would agree with them?
[166]
[167] Yes, he said, certainly I should.
[168]
[169] His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain
[170] confidence, and the vital heat returned. Such, Charmides, I said, is the
[171] nature of the charm, which I learned when serving with the army from one of
[172] the physicians of the Thracian king Zamolxis, who are said to be so skilful
[173] that they can even give immortality. This Thracian told me that in these
[174] notions of theirs, which I was just now mentioning, the Greek physicians
[175] are quite right as far as they go; but Zamolxis, he added, our king, who is
[176] also a god, says further, 'that as you ought not to attempt to cure the
[177] eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you
[178] to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this,' he said, 'is the
[179] reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of
[180] Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied
[181] also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is well.' For all
[182] good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, originates, as he
[183] declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as if from the head into
[184] the eyes. And therefore if the head and body are to be well, you must
[185] begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear
[186] youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms
[187] are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, and where
[188] temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but
[189] to the whole body. And he who taught me the cure and the charm at the same
[190] time added a special direction: 'Let no one,' he said, 'persuade you to
[191] cure the head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the
[192] charm. For this,' he said, 'is the great error of our day in the treatment
[193] of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body.' And
[194] he added with emphasis, at the same time making me swear to his words, 'Let
[195] no one, however rich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to give him the cure,
[196] without the charm.' Now I have sworn, and I must keep my oath, and
[197] therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your
[198] soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to apply the cure
[199] to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my dear
[200] Charmides.
[201]
[202] Critias, when he heard this, said: The headache will be an unexpected gain
[203] to my young relation, if the pain in his head compels him to improve his
[204] mind: and I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not only pre-eminent
[205] in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality which is given by the
[206] charm; and this, as you say, is temperance?
[207]
[208] Yes, I said.
[209]
[210] Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings, and for
[211] his age inferior to none in any quality.
[212]
[213] Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel others
[214] in all good qualities; for if I am not mistaken there is no one present who
[215] could easily point out two Athenian houses, whose union would be likely to
[216] produce a better or nobler scion than the two from which you are sprung.
[217] There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias the son of
[218] Dropidas, whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrical verses of
[219] Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, as famous for beauty and virtue and
[220] all other high fortune: and your mother's house is equally distinguished;
[221] for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, is reputed never to have found his
[222] equal, in Persia at the court of the great king, or on the continent of
[223] Asia, in all the places to which he went as ambassador, for stature and
[224] beauty; that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such
[225] ancestors you ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son of Glaucon,
[226] your outward form is no dishonour to any of them. If to beauty you add
[227] temperance, and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to
[228] be, then, dear Charmides, blessed art thou, in being the son of thy mother.
[229] And here lies the point; for if, as he declares, you have this gift of
[230] temperance already, and are temperate enough, in that case you have no need
[231] of any charms, whether of Zamolxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and I may
[232] as well let you have the cure of the head at once; but if you have not yet
[233] acquired this quality, I must use the charm before I give you the medicine.
[234] Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias
[235] has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance?
[236]
[237] Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is
[238] becoming in youth; he then said very ingenuously, that he really could not
[239] at once answer, either yes, or no, to the question which I had asked: For,
[240] said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing
[241] for me to say of myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, and
[242] many others who think as he tells you, that I am temperate: but, on the
[243] other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself, which would
[244] be ill manners; and therefore I do not know how to answer you.
[245]
[246] I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that you
[247] and I ought together to enquire whether you have this quality about which I
[248] am asking or not; and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not
[249] like; neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine: therefore, if
[250] you please, I will share the enquiry with you, but I will not press you if
[251] you would rather not.
[252]
[253] There is nothing which I should like better, he said; and as far as I am
[254] concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best.
[255]
[256] I think, I said, that I had better begin by asking you a question; for if
[257] temperance abides in you, you must have an opinion about her; she must give
[258] some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable you to form a
[259] notion of her. Is not that true?
[260]
[261] Yes, he said, that I think is true.
[262]
[263] You know your native language, I said, and therefore you must be able to
[264] tell what you feel about this.
[265]
[266] Certainly, he said.
[267]
[268] In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance
[269] abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is
[270] Temperance?
[271]
[272] At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer: then he said that
[273] he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things for
[274] example as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything else of that
[275] nature. In a word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion,
[276] temperance is quietness.
[277]
[278] Are you right, Charmides? I said. No doubt some would affirm that the
[279] quiet are the temperate; but let us see whether these words have any
[280] meaning; and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to
[281] be of the class of the noble and good?
[282]
[283] Yes.
[284]
[285] But which is best when you are at the writing-master's, to write the same
[286] letters quickly or quietly?
[287]
[288] Quickly.
[289]
[290] And to read quickly or slowly?
[291]
[292] Quickly again.
[293]
[294] And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far
[295] better than quietness and slowness?
[296]
[297] Yes.
[298]
[299] And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium?
[300]
[301] Certainly.
[302]
[303] And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and
[304] agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad?
[305]
[306] That is evident.
[307]
[308] Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest
[309] agility and quickness, is noblest and best?
[310]
[311] Yes, certainly.
[312]
[313] And is temperance a good?
[314]
[315] Yes.
[316]
[317] Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the
[318] higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good?
[319]
[320] True, he said.
[321]
[322] And which, I said, is better--facility in learning, or difficulty in
[323] learning?
[324]
[325] Facility.
[326]
[327] Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty
[328] in learning is learning quietly and slowly?
[329]
[330] True.
[331]
[332] And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather
[333] than quietly and slowly?
[334]
[335] Yes.
[336]
[337] And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily,
[338] or quietly and slowly?
[339]
[340] The former.
[341]
[342] And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a
[343] quietness?
[344]
[345] True.
[346]
[347] And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the writing-
[348] master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as quietly as
[349] possible, but as quickly as possible?
[350]
[351] Yes.
[352]
[353] And in the searchings or deliberations of the soul, not the quietest, as I
[354] imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is thought
[355] worthy of praise, but he who does so most easily and quickly?
[356]
[357] Quite true, he said.
[358]
[359] And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are
[360] clearly better than slowness and quietness?
[361]
[362] Clearly they are.
[363]
[364] Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life quiet,--
[365] certainly not upon this view; for the life which is temperate is supposed
[366] to be the good. And of two things, one is true,--either never, or very
[367] seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and
[368] energetic ones; or supposing that of the nobler actions, there are as many
[369] quiet, as quick and vehement: still, even if we grant this, temperance
[370] will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly and energetically,
[371] either in walking or talking or in anything else; nor will the quiet life
[372] be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that temperance is admitted by
[373] us to be a good and noble thing, and the quick have been shown to be as
[374] good as the quiet.
[375]
[376] I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right.
[377]
[378] Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within;
[379] consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature of
[380] that which has the effect. Think over all this, and, like a brave youth,
[381] tell me--What is temperance?
[382]
[383] After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, he
[384] said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or
[385] modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.
[386]
[387] Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is
[388] noble?
[389]
[390] Yes, certainly, he said.
[391]
[392] And the temperate are also good?
[393]
[394] Yes.
[395]
[396] And can that be good which does not make men good?
[397]
[398] Certainly not.
[399]
[400] And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?
[401]
[402] That is my opinion.
[403]
[404] Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,
[405]
[406] 'Modesty is not good for a needy man'?
[407]
[408] Yes, he said; I agree.
[409]
[410] Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?
[411]
[412] Clearly.
[413]
[414] But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always
[415] good?
[416]
[417] That appears to me to be as you say.
[418]
[419] And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty--if temperance is a
[420] good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?
[421]
[422] All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true; but I should like to know
[423] what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just now
[424] remember to have heard from some one, who said, 'That temperance is doing
[425] our own business.' Was he right who affirmed that?
[426]
[427] You monster! I said; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told
[428] you.
[429]
[430] Some one else, then, said Critias; for certainly I have not.
[431]
[432] But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this?
[433]
[434] No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but
[435] whether they are true or not.
[436]
[437] There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied.
[438]
[439] To be sure, I said; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover
[440] their truth or falsehood; for they are a kind of riddle.
[441]
[442] What makes you think so? he said.
[443]
[444] Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing,
[445] and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing
[446] nothing when he reads or writes?
[447]
[448] I should rather think that he was doing something.
[449]
[450] And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, your
[451] own names only, or did you write your enemies' names as well as your own
[452] and your friends'?
[453]
[454] As much one as the other.
[455]
[456] And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?
[457]
[458] Certainly not.
[459]
[460] And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what
[461] was not your own business?
[462]
[463] But they are the same as doing.
[464]
[465] And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing
[466] anything whatever which is done by art,--these all clearly come under the
[467] head of doing?
[468]
[469] Certainly.
[470]
[471] And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which
[472] compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own shoes,
[473] and his own flask and strigil, and other implements, on this principle of
[474] every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from what is not his
[475] own?
[476]
[477] I think not, he said.
[478]
[479] But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state.
[480]
[481] Of course, he replied.
[482]
[483] Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business; not at least
[484] in this way, or doing things of this sort?
[485]
[486] Clearly not.
[487]
[488] Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man
[489] doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I do not think
[490] that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who
[491] told you, Charmides?
[492]
[493] Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man.
[494]
[495] Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle,
[496] thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words 'doing his own
[497] business.'
[498]
[499] I dare say, he replied.
[500]
[501] And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me?
[502]
[503] Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder if the man himself who used this
[504] phrase did not understand what he was saying. Whereupon he laughed slyly,
[505] and looked at Critias.
[506]
[507] Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a
[508] reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had,
[509] however, hitherto managed to restrain himself; but now he could no longer
[510] forbear, and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which I
[511] entertained at the time, that Charmides had heard this answer about
[512] temperance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not want to answer
[513] himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on
[514] pointing out that he had been refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and
[515] appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet might
[516] quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them; so he looked
[517] hard at him and said--
[518]
[519] Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of this definition of temperance
[520] did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you do not
[521] understand them?
[522]
[523] Why, at his age, I said, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be expected
[524] to understand; but you, who are older, and have studied, may well be
[525] assumed to know the meaning of them; and therefore, if you agree with him,
[526] and accept his definition of temperance, I would much rather argue with you
[527] than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition.
[528]
[529] I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition.
[530]
[531] Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question--Do you admit, as I
[532] was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something?
[533]
[534] I do.
[535]
[536] And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also?
[537]
[538] They make or do that of others also.
[539]
[540] And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their
[541] own business only?
[542]
[543] Why not? he said.
[544]
[545] No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a difficulty on his who
[546] proposes as a definition of temperance, 'doing one's own business,' and
[547] then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others
[548] should not be temperate.
[549]
[550] Nay (The English reader has to observe that the word 'make' (Greek), in
[551] Greek, has also the sense of 'do' (Greek).), said he; did I ever
[552] acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I
[553] said, those who make, not those who do.
[554]
[555] What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?
[556]
[557] No more, he replied, than making or working are the same; thus much I have
[558] learned from Hesiod, who says that 'work is no disgrace.' Now do you
[559] imagine that if he had meant by working and doing such things as you were
[560] describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them--for
[561] example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling pickles, or sitting for
[562] hire in a house of ill-fame? That, Socrates, is not to be supposed: but I
[563] conceive him to have distinguished making from doing and work; and, while
[564] admitting that the making anything might sometimes become a disgrace, when
[565] the employment was not honourable, to have thought that work was never any
[566] disgrace at all. For things nobly and usefully made he called works; and
[567] such makings he called workings, and doings; and he must be supposed to
[568] have called such things only man's proper business, and what is hurtful,
[569] not his business: and in that sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, may be
[570] reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his own work.
[571]
[572] O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your mouth, than I pretty well
[573] knew that you would call that which is proper to a man, and that which