Cratylus
by
Plato
Cratylus
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Cratylus by Plato.
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[2]
[3]
[4] HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?
[5]
[6] CRATYLUS: If you please.
[7]
[8] HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus
[9] has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not
[10] conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; but
[11] that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for
[12] Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of
[13] Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates?
[14] 'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called.
[15] To this he replies--'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that
[16] would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have a further
[17] explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a
[18] notion of his own about the matter, if he would only tell, and could
[19] entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates,
[20] what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is
[21] your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far
[22] sooner hear.
[23]
[24] SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the
[25] knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of
[26] knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma
[27] course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and
[28] language--these are his own words--and then I should have been at once able
[29] to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I
[30] have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the
[31] truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus
[32] in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not
[33] really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;--he means
[34] to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking
[35] after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good
[36] deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better
[37] leave the question open until we have heard both sides.
[38]
[39] HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and
[40] others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of
[41] correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which
[42] you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give
[43] another, the new name is as correct as the old--we frequently change the
[44] names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for
[45] there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit
[46] of the users;--such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to
[47] hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else.
[48]
[49] SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;--Your
[50] meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees
[51] to call it?
[52]
[53] HERMOGENES: That is my notion.
[54]
[55] SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?
[56]
[57] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[58]
[59] SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;--suppose that I call a man a
[60] horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a
[61] horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the
[62] world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by
[63] the world:--that is your meaning?
[64]
[65] HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view.
[66]
[67] SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is
[68] in words a true and a false?
[69]
[70] HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[71]
[72] SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?
[73]
[74] HERMOGENES: To be sure.
[75]
[76] SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false
[77] proposition says that which is not?
[78]
[79] HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible?
[80]
[81] SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false?
[82]
[83] HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[84]
[85] SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts
[86] untrue?
[87]
[88] HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole.
[89]
[90] SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every
[91] part?
[92]
[93] HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true.
[94]
[95] SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?
[96]
[97] HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest.
[98]
[99] SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition?
[100]
[101] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[102]
[103] SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say.
[104]
[105] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[106]
[107] SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?
[108]
[109] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[110]
[111] SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true
[112] and false?
[113]
[114] HERMOGENES: So we must infer.
[115]
[116] SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the
[117] name?
[118]
[119] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[120]
[121] SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says
[122] that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?
[123]
[124] HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other
[125] than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and
[126] countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ
[127] from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from
[128] one another.
[129]
[130] SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the
[131] names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us?
[132] For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to
[133] me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you.
[134] Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent
[135] essence of their own?
[136]
[137] HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my
[138] perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at
[139] all.
[140]
[141] SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such
[142] thing as a bad man?
[143]
[144] HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there
[145] are very bad men, and a good many of them.
[146]
[147] SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?
[148]
[149] HERMOGENES: Not many.
[150]
[151] SOCRATES: Still you have found them?
[152]
[153] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[154]
[155] SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and
[156] the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?
[157]
[158] HERMOGENES: It would.
[159]
[160] SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as
[161] they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?
[162]
[163] HERMOGENES: Impossible.
[164]
[165] SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really
[166] distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras
[167] can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one
[168] man cannot in reality be wiser than another.
[169]
[170] HERMOGENES: He cannot.
[171]
[172] SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things
[173] equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his
[174] view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always
[175] equally to be attributed to all.
[176]
[177] HERMOGENES: There cannot.
[178]
[179] SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to
[180] individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment
[181] and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent
[182] essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating
[183] according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own
[184] essence the relation prescribed by nature.
[185]
[186] HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.
[187]
[188] SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or
[189] equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a
[190] class of being?
[191]
[192] HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.
[193]
[194] SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature,
[195] and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do
[196] not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the
[197] proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting;
[198] and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail
[199] and be of no use at all.
[200]
[201] HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way.
[202]
[203] SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right
[204] way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument.
[205]
[206] HERMOGENES: True.
[207]
[208] SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?
[209]
[210] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[211]
[212] SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?
[213]
[214] HERMOGENES: True.
[215]
[216] SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will
[217] not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of
[218] speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural
[219] instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure.
[220]
[221] HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you.
[222]
[223] SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men
[224] speak.
[225]
[226] HERMOGENES: That is true.
[227]
[228] SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts,
[229] is not naming also a sort of action?
[230]
[231] HERMOGENES: True.
[232]
[233] SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had
[234] a special nature of their own?
[235]
[236] HERMOGENES: Precisely.
[237]
[238] SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be
[239] given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not
[240] at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success.
[241]
[242] HERMOGENES: I agree.
[243]
[244] SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with
[245] something?
[246]
[247] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[248]
[249] SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or
[250] pierced with something?
[251]
[252] HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[253]
[254] SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something?
[255]
[256] HERMOGENES: True.
[257]
[258] SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce?
[259]
[260] HERMOGENES: An awl.
[261]
[262] SOCRATES: And with which we weave?
[263]
[264] HERMOGENES: A shuttle.
[265]
[266] SOCRATES: And with which we name?
[267]
[268] HERMOGENES: A name.
[269]
[270] SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
[271]
[272] HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[273]
[274] SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle?' And
[275] you answer, 'A weaving instrument.'
[276]
[277] HERMOGENES: Well.
[278]
[279] SOCRATES: And I ask again, 'What do we do when we weave?'--The answer is,
[280] that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.
[281]
[282] HERMOGENES: Very true.
[283]
[284] SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of
[285] instruments in general?
[286]
[287] HERMOGENES: To be sure.
[288]
[289] SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will
[290] you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we
[291] name?
[292]
[293] HERMOGENES: I cannot say.
[294]
[295] SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish
[296] things according to their natures?
[297]
[298] HERMOGENES: Certainly we do.
[299]
[300] SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing
[301] natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.
[302]
[303] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[304]
[305] SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?
[306]
[307] HERMOGENES: Assuredly.
[308]
[309] SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well--and well means like a
[310] weaver? and the teacher will use the name well--and well means like a
[311] teacher?
[312]
[313] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[314]
[315] SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be
[316] using well?
[317]
[318] HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter.
[319]
[320] SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?
[321]
[322] HERMOGENES: Only the skilled.
[323]
[324] SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using
[325] well?
[326]
[327] HERMOGENES: That of the smith.
[328]
[329] SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?
[330]
[331] HERMOGENES: The skilled only.
[332]
[333] SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?
[334]
[335] HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled.
[336]
[337] SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?
[338]
[339] HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.
[340]
[341] SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them?
[342]
[343] HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so.
[344]
[345] SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the
[346] legislator?
[347]
[348] HERMOGENES: I agree.
[349]
[350] SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?
[351]
[352] HERMOGENES: The skilled only.
[353]
[354] SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only
[355] a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans
[356] in the world is the rarest.
[357]
[358] HERMOGENES: True.
[359]
[360] SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he
[361] look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does
[362] the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which
[363] is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?
[364]
[365] HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[366]
[367] SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make
[368] another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according
[369] to which he made the other?
[370]
[371] HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine.
[372]
[373] SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?
[374]
[375] HERMOGENES: I think so.
[376]
[377] SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of
[378] garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all
[379] of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle
[380] best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the
[381] maker produces in each case.
[382]
[383] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[384]
[385] SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has
[386] discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must
[387] express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the
[388] material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to
[389] know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their
[390] several uses?
[391]
[392] HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[393]
[394] SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to
[395] their uses?
[396]
[397] HERMOGENES: True.
[398]
[399] SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the
[400] several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.
[401]
[402] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[403]
[404] SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to
[405] put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to
[406] make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a
[407] namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators
[408] will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he
[409] may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of
[410] the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and
[411] still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in
[412] Hellas or in a foreign country;--there is no difference.
[413]
[414] HERMOGENES: Very true.
[415]
[416] SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not
[417] therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the
[418] true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that
[419] country makes no matter.
[420]
[421] HERMOGENES: Quite true.
[422]
[423] SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to
[424] the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or
[425] the weaver who is to use them?
[426]
[427] HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.
[428]
[429] SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man
[430] who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether
[431] the work is being well done or not?
[432]
[433] HERMOGENES: Certainly.
[434]
[435] SOCRATES: And who is he?
[436]
[437] HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre.
[438]
[439] SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright?
[440]
[441] HERMOGENES: The pilot.
[442]
[443] SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work,
[444] and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country?
[445] Will not the user be the man?
[446]
[447] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[448]
[449] SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions?
[450]
[451] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[452]
[453] SOCRATES: And how to answer them?
[454]
[455] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[456]
[457] SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a
[458] dialectician?
[459]
[460] HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name.
[461]
[462] SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the
[463] pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.
[464]
[465] HERMOGENES: True.
[466]
[467] SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the
[468] dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?
[469]
[470] HERMOGENES: That is true.
[471]
[472] SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be
[473] no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons;
[474] and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that
[475] not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name
[476] which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of
[477] things in letters and syllables.
[478]
[479] HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in
[480] changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more
[481] readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the
[482] natural fitness of names.
[483]
[484] SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you
[485] just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to
[486] share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the
[487] matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by
[488] nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.
[489]
[490] HERMOGENES: Very good.
[491]
[492] SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?
[493] That, if you care to know, is the next question.
[494]
[495] HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know.
[496]
[497] SOCRATES: Then reflect.
[498]
[499] HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect?
[500]
[501] SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and
[502] you must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists,
[503] of whom your brother, Callias, has--rather dearly--bought the reputation of
[504] wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you
[505] had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has
[506] learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.
[507]
[508] HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating
[509] Protagoras and his truth ('Truth' was the title of the book of Protagoras;
[510] compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and his book
[511] affirm!
[512]
[513] SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.
[514]
[515] HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does
[516] he say?
[517]
[518] SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where
[519] he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same
[520] things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about
[521] the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call
[522] things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?
[523]
[524] HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at
[525] all. But to what are you referring?
[526]
[527] SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a
[528] single combat with Hephaestus?
[529]
[530] 'Whom,' as he says, 'the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.'
[531]
[532] HERMOGENES: I remember.
[533]
[534] SOCRATES: Well, and about this river--to know that he ought to be called
[535] Xanthus and not Scamander--is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird
[536] which, as he says,
[537]
[538] 'The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:'
[539]
[540] to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name
[541] Cymindis--do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina?
[542] (Compare Il. 'The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb of
[543] the sportive Myrina.') And there are many other observations of the same
[544] kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the
[545] understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax,
[546] which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within
[547] the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet
[548] means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you
[549] will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.)
[550]
[551] HERMOGENES: I do.
[552]
[553] SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of
[554] the names given to Hector's son--Astyanax or Scamandrius?
[555]
[556] HERMOGENES: I do not know.
[557]
[558] SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the
[559] unwise are more likely to give correct names?
[560]
[561] HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course.
[562]
[563] SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the
[564] wiser?
[565]
[566] HERMOGENES: I should say, the men.
[567]
[568] SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him
[569] Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other
[570] name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.
[571]
[572] HERMOGENES: That may be inferred.
[573]
[574] SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than
[575] their wives?
[576]
[577] HERMOGENES: To be sure.
[578]
[579] SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for
[580] the boy than Scamandrius?
[581]
[582] HERMOGENES: Clearly.
[583]
[584] SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:--does he not
[585] himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,
[586]
[587] 'For he alone defended their city and long walls'?
[588]
[589] This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of
[590] the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.
[591]
[592] HERMOGENES: I see.
[593]
[594] SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?
[595]
[596] HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I.
[597]
[598] SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his
[599] name?
[600]
[601] HERMOGENES: What of that?
[602]
[603] SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of
[604] Astyanax--both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have
[605] nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is
[606] clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and
[607] holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and
[608] indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined
[609] that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the
[610] correctness of names.
[611]
[612] HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be
[613] on the right track.
[614]
[615] SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion,
[616] and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course
[617] of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary
[618] births;--if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call
[619] that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a
[620] natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you
[621] agree with me?
[622]
[623] HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree.
[624]
[625] SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not
[626] play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be
[627] called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not
[628] the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does
[629] the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the
[630] essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.
[631]
[632] HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
[633]
[634] SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names
[635] of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with
[636] the exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of
[637] the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which
[638] we add to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be
[639] no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example,
[640] the letter beta--the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, and
[641] does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator
[642] intended--so well did he know how to give the letters names.
[643]
[644] HERMOGENES: I believe you are right.
[645]
[646] SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the
[647] son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and
[648] similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is
[649] like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be
[650] disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may
[651] not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would
[652] not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell,
[653] although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the
[654] same, and he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the
[655] etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction
[656] of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this
[657] need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of
[658] Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is tau, and yet they
[659] have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their
[660] names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)--and yet the meaning is the same.
[661] And there are many other names which just mean 'king.' Again, there are
[662] several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus
[663] (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a
[664] physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of
[665] mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in
[666] their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not
[667] say so?
[668]
[669] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[670]
[671] SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow
[672] in the course of nature?
[673]
[674] HERMOGENES: Yes.
[675]
[676] SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and
[677] are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an
[678] irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the
[679] class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of
[680] a horse foaling a calf.
[681]
[682] HERMOGENES: Quite true.
[683]
[684] SOCRATES: Then the