Meno
by
Plato
Meno
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[2] MENO
[3]
[4] by
[5]
[6] Plato
[7]
[8] Translated by Benjamin Jowett
[9]
[10]
[11] PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno (Boy), Anytus.
[12]
[13]
[14] MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or
[15] by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it
[16] comes to man by nature, or in what other way?
[17]
[18] SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among
[19] the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am
[20] not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at
[21] Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is
[22] Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among
[23] them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell
[24] in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering
[25] questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is
[26] the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes
[27] may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at
[28] Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have
[29] emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any
[30] Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your
[31] face, and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you
[32] think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what
[33] virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I
[34] myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the
[35] rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing
[36] about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know
[37] the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was
[38] fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and
[39] noble? Do you think that I could?
[40]
[41] MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do
[42] not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to
[43] Thessaly?
[44]
[45] SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have
[46] never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.
[47]
[48] MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?
[49]
[50] SOCRATES: Yes, I have.
[51]
[52] MENO: And did you not think that he knew?
[53]
[54] SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell
[55] what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and
[56] that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he
[57] said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that
[58] you and he think much alike.
[59]
[60] MENO: Very true.
[61]
[62] SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By
[63] the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I
[64] shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you
[65] and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying
[66] that I have never found anybody who had.
[67]
[68] MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question.
[69] Let us take first the virtue of a man--he should know how to administer the
[70] state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his
[71] enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's
[72] virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her
[73] duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband.
[74] Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or
[75] free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of
[76] definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each
[77] of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates
[78] (Compare Arist. Pol.).
[79]
[80] SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you
[81] present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your
[82] keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you,
[83] What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of
[84] bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and
[85] different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some
[86] other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer
[87] me?
[88]
[89] MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.
[90]
[91] SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno;
[92] tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all
[93] alike;--would you be able to answer?
[94]
[95] MENO: I should.
[96]
[97] SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be,
[98] they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who
[99] would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye
[100] fixed: Do you understand?
[101]
[102] MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the
[103] question as I could wish.
[104]
[105] SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another
[106] of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue,
[107] or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the
[108] nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?
[109]
[110] MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.
[111]
[112] SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is
[113] strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same
[114] strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that
[115] strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any
[116] difference?
[117]
[118] MENO: I think not.
[119]
[120] SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child
[121] or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?
[122]
[123] MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from
[124] the others.
[125]
[126] SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to
[127] order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?
[128]
[129] MENO: I did say so.
[130]
[131] SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered
[132] without temperance and without justice?
[133]
[134] MENO: Certainly not.
[135]
[136] SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly
[137] order them with temperance and justice?
[138]
[139] MENO: Certainly.
[140]
[141] SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women,
[142] must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?
[143]
[144] MENO: True.
[145]
[146] SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are
[147] intemperate and unjust?
[148]
[149] MENO: They cannot.
[150]
[151] SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just?
[152]
[153] MENO: Yes.
[154]
[155] SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in
[156] the same virtues?
[157]
[158] MENO: Such is the inference.
[159]
[160] SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless
[161] their virtue had been the same?
[162]
[163] MENO: They would not.
[164]
[165] SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try
[166] and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.
[167]
[168] MENO: Will you have one definition of them all?
[169]
[170] SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking.
[171]
[172] MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to
[173] say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.
[174]
[175] SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is
[176] virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his
[177] father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a
[178] slave?
[179]
[180] MENO: I think not, Socrates.
[181]
[182] SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more,
[183] fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do
[184] you not add 'justly and not unjustly'?
[185]
[186] MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.
[187]
[188] SOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'?
[189]
[190] MENO: What do you mean?
[191]
[192] SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example,
[193] is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode of
[194] speaking, because there are other figures.
[195]
[196] MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue--that
[197] there are other virtues as well as justice.
[198]
[199] SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you
[200] the names of the other figures if you asked me.
[201]
[202] MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and
[203] there are many others.
[204]
[205] SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching
[206] after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before;
[207] but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them
[208] all.
[209]
[210] MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt
[211] to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.
[212]
[213] SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know
[214] that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you
[215] the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure?
[216] And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of
[217] speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a
[218] figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.'
[219]
[220] MENO: Certainly.
[221]
[222] SOCRATES: And for this reason--that there are other figures?
[223]
[224] MENO: Yes.
[225]
[226] SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you
[227] would have told him.
[228]
[229] MENO: I should.
[230]
[231] SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered
[232] whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is
[233] colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other
[234] colours as well.
[235]
[236] MENO: I should.
[237]
[238] SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have told
[239] him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.
[240]
[241] MENO: Yes.
[242]
[243] SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he
[244] would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not
[245] what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say
[246] that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that
[247] common nature which you designate as figure--which contains straight as
[248] well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would be your mode
[249] of speaking?
[250]
[251] MENO: Yes.
[252]
[253] SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is
[254] round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?
[255]
[256] MENO: Certainly not.
[257]
[258] SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than
[259] the straight, or the straight than the round?
[260]
[261] MENO: Very true.
[262]
[263] SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer.
[264] Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or
[265] colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know
[266] what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not
[267] understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might
[268] put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile
[269] in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only round and
[270] straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I
[271] wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to
[272] the answer about virtue.
[273]
[274] MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.
[275]
[276] SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?
[277]
[278] MENO: By all means.
[279]
[280] SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?
[281]
[282] MENO: I will.
[283]
[284] SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.
[285]
[286] MENO: Certainly.
[287]
[288] SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you
[289] say to this answer?--Figure is the only thing which always follows colour.
[290] Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would
[291] let me have a similar definition of virtue?
[292]
[293] MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.
[294]
[295] SOCRATES: Why simple?
[296]
[297] MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows
[298] colour.
[299]
[300] (SOCRATES: Granted.)
[301]
[302] MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is,
[303] any more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given him?
[304]
[305] SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher
[306] of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my
[307] answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and
[308] refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now,
[309] I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that
[310] is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of
[311] premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And
[312] this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will
[313] acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or
[314] termination, or extremity?--all which words I use in the same sense,
[315] although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but
[316] still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated--that
[317] is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult.
[318]
[319] MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.
[320]
[321] SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for
[322] example in geometry.
[323]
[324] MENO: Yes.
[325]
[326] SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my
[327] definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends;
[328] or, more concisely, the limit of solid.
[329]
[330] MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?
[331]
[332] SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to
[333] give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what
[334] is Gorgias' definition of virtue.
[335]
[336] MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.
[337]
[338] SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he
[339] would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.
[340]
[341] MENO: Why do you think so?
[342]
[343] SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties
[344] when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect,
[345] you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to
[346] humour you I must answer.
[347]
[348] MENO: Please do.
[349]
[350] SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias,
[351] which is familiar to you?
[352]
[353] MENO: I should like nothing better.
[354]
[355] SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain
[356] effluences of existence?
[357]
[358] MENO: Certainly.
[359]
[360] SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
[361]
[362] MENO: Exactly.
[363]
[364] SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of
[365] them are too small or too large?
[366]
[367] MENO: True.
[368]
[369] SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?
[370]
[371] MENO: Yes.
[372]
[373] SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'--colour is an
[374] effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.
[375]
[376] MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.
[377]
[378] SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in
[379] the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that
[380] you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many
[381] other similar phenomena.
[382]
[383] MENO: Quite true.
[384]
[385] SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore
[386] was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.
[387]
[388] MENO: Yes.
[389]
[390] SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the
[391] other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion,
[392] if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you
[393] said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.
[394]
[395] MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.
[396]
[397] SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my
[398] very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many
[399] as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell
[400] me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a
[401] plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue
[402] to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have
[403] given you the pattern.
[404]
[405] MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires
[406] the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I
[407] say too--
[408]
[409] 'Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining
[410] them.'
[411]
[412] SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?
[413]
[414] MENO: Certainly.
[415]
[416] SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire
[417] the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?
[418]
[419] MENO: I think not.
[420]
[421] SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?
[422]
[423] MENO: Yes.
[424]
[425] SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be
[426] good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?
[427]
[428] MENO: Both, I think.
[429]
[430] SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be
[431] evils and desires them notwithstanding?
[432]
[433] MENO: Certainly I do.
[434]
[435] SOCRATES: And desire is of possession?
[436]
[437] MENO: Yes, of possession.
[438]
[439] SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who
[440] possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?
[441]
[442] MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and
[443] others who know that they will do them harm.
[444]
[445] SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them
[446] good know that they are evils?
[447]
[448] MENO: Certainly not.
[449]
[450] SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do
[451] not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although
[452] they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be
[453] goods they really desire goods?
[454]
[455] MENO: Yes, in that case.
[456]
[457] SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that
[458] evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by
[459] them?
[460]
[461] MENO: They must know it.
[462]
[463] SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable
[464] in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?
[465]
[466] MENO: How can it be otherwise?
[467]
[468] SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated?
[469]
[470] MENO: Yes, indeed.
[471]
[472] SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?
[473]
[474] MENO: I should say not, Socrates.
[475]
[476] SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no
[477] one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and
[478] possession of evil?
[479]
[480] MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody
[481] desires evil.
[482]
[483] SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire
[484] and power of attaining good?
[485]
[486] MENO: Yes, I did say so.
[487]
[488] SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to
[489] all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?
[490]
[491] MENO: True.
[492]
[493] SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he
[494] must be better in the power of attaining it?
[495]
[496] MENO: Exactly.
[497]
[498] SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be
[499] the power of attaining good?
[500]
[501] MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view
[502] this matter.
[503]
[504] SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point
[505] of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to be the
[506] power of attaining goods?
[507]
[508] MENO: Yes.
[509]
[510] SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and
[511] the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the
[512] state--those are what you would call goods?
[513]
[514] MENO: Yes, I should include all those.
[515]
[516] SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the
[517] great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you
[518] add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of
[519] no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and
[520] dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?
[521]
[522] MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.
[523]
[524] SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of
[525] virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them
[526] the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.
[527]
[528] MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?
[529]
[530] SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner
[531] for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally
[532] virtue?
[533]
[534] MENO: True.
[535]
[536] SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the
[537] non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or
[538] honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.
[539]
[540] MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.
[541]
[542] SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and
[543] the like, were each of them a part of virtue?
[544]
[545] MENO: Yes.
[546]
[547] SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.
[548]
[549] MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?
[550]
[551] SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole
[552] and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame
[553] your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the
[554] power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you
[555] acknowledge to be a part of virtue.
[556]
[557] MENO: Yes.
[558]
[559] SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing
[560] what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you
[561] to be parts of virtue.
[562]
[563] MENO: What of that?
[564]
[565] SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of
[566] virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare
[567] every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though
[568] you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too
[569] when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I
[570] fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue?
[571] for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue
[572] is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with
[573] justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any
[574] one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?
[575]
[576] MENO: No; I do not say that he can.
[577]
[578] SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any
[579] answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?
[580]
[581] MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.
[582]
[583] SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any
[584] one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of
[585] virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over
[586] again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?
[587]
[588] MENO: I believe that you are.
[589]
[590] SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your
[591] friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?
[592]
[593] MENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were
[594] always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting
[595] your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and
[596] am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem
[597] to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like
[598] the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him,
[599] as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are
[600] really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been
[601] delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and
[602] to many persons--and very good ones they were, as I thought--at this moment
[603] I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in
[604] not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as
[605] you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.
[606]
[607] SOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.
[608]
[609] MENO: What do you mean, Socrates?
[610]
[611] SOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me.
[612]
[613] MENO: Why?
[614]
[615] SOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know
[616] that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about
[617] them--as well they may--but I shall not return the compliment. As to my
[618] being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity
[619] in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex
[620] others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself.
[621] And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case,
[622] although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have
[623] no objection to join with you in the enquiry.
[624]
[625] MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know?
[626] What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what
[627] you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not
[628] know?
[629]
[630] SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome
[631] dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either
[632] about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he
[633] knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not
[634] know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot. Post.
[635] Anal.).
[636]
[637] MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?
[638]
[639] SOCRATES: I think not.
[640]
[641] MENO: Why not?
[642]
[643] SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and
[644] women who spoke of things divine that--
[645]
[646] MENO: What did they say?
[647]
[648] SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.
[649]
[650] MENO: What was it? and who were they?
[651]
[652] SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how
[653] they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been
[654] poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many
[655] others who were inspired. And they say--mark, now, and see whether their
[656] words are true--they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time
[657] has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but
[658] is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in
[659] perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of
[660] those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again
[661] from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become
[662] noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly
[663] heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been
[664] born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in
[665] this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no
[666] wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever
[667] knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the
[668] soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as
[669] men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is
[670] strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but
[671] recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical
[672] argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and
[673] is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and
[674] inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the
[675] nature of virtue.
[676]
[677] MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn,
[678] and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you
[679] teach me how this is?
[680]
[681] SOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you