Phaedo
by
Plato
Phaedo
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[2] Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius.
[3] Socrates, Apollodorus, Simmias, Cebes, Crito and an Attendant of the
[4] Prison.
[5]
[6] SCENE: The Prison of Socrates.
[7]
[8] PLACE OF THE NARRATION: Phlius.
[9]
[10]
[11] ECHECRATES: Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the
[12] day when he drank the poison?
[13]
[14] PHAEDO: Yes, Echecrates, I was.
[15]
[16] ECHECRATES: I should so like to hear about his death. What did he say in
[17] his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one
[18] knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it is a
[19] long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; so that
[20] we had no clear account.
[21]
[22] PHAEDO: Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?
[23]
[24] ECHECRATES: Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not
[25] understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death,
[26] not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this?
[27]
[28] PHAEDO: An accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the
[29] Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he
[30] was tried.
[31]
[32] ECHECRATES: What is this ship?
[33]
[34] PHAEDO: It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, Theseus
[35] went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was the
[36] saviour of them and of himself. And they were said to have vowed to Apollo
[37] at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to
[38] Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage
[39] to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of
[40] the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be
[41] polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary
[42] winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable. As I
[43] was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was
[44] the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long
[45] after he was condemned.
[46]
[47] ECHECRATES: What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or
[48] done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities
[49] forbid them to be present--so that he had no friends near him when he died?
[50]
[51] PHAEDO: No; there were several of them with him.
[52]
[53] ECHECRATES: If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what
[54] passed, as exactly as you can.
[55]
[56] PHAEDO: I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish.
[57] To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether I
[58] speak myself or hear another speak of him.
[59]
[60] ECHECRATES: You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and
[61] I hope that you will be as exact as you can.
[62]
[63] PHAEDO: I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I could
[64] hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I
[65] did not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and his words and
[66] bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed. I
[67] thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine
[68] call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived
[69] there, and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at
[70] such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in
[71] philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke).
[72] I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of
[73] pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die, and this double feeling was
[74] shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the
[75] excitable Apollodorus--you know the sort of man?
[76]
[77] ECHECRATES: Yes.
[78]
[79] PHAEDO: He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly
[80] moved.
[81]
[82] ECHECRATES: Who were present?
[83]
[84] PHAEDO: Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus
[85] and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes;
[86] likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others;
[87] Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.
[88]
[89] ECHECRATES: Were there any strangers?
[90]
[91] PHAEDO: Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes;
[92] Euclid and Terpison, who came from Megara.
[93]
[94] ECHECRATES: And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?
[95]
[96] PHAEDO: No, they were said to be in Aegina.
[97]
[98] ECHECRATES: Any one else?
[99]
[100] PHAEDO: I think that these were nearly all.
[101]
[102] ECHECRATES: Well, and what did you talk about?
[103]
[104] PHAEDO: I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire
[105] conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling
[106] early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place, and which
[107] is not far from the prison. There we used to wait talking with one another
[108] until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early); then
[109] we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning
[110] we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we
[111] quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come from Delos,
[112] and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our
[113] arrival the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out
[114] and told us to stay until he called us. 'For the Eleven,' he said, 'are
[115] now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that
[116] he is to die to-day.' He soon returned and said that we might come in. On
[117] entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom
[118] you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw
[119] us she uttered a cry and said, as women will: 'O Socrates, this is the
[120] last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with
[121] you.' Socrates turned to Crito and said: 'Crito, let some one take her
[122] home.' Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and
[123] beating herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch,
[124] bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing: How singular is the
[125] thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be
[126] thought to be the opposite of it; for they are never present to a man at
[127] the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to
[128] take the other; their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head.
[129] And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have
[130] made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how, when he
[131] could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why
[132] when one comes the other follows, as I know by my own experience now, when
[133] after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to
[134] succeed.
[135]
[136] Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the
[137] name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by
[138] many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet
[139] --he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to
[140] have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to
[141] him:--he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry,
[142] now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also
[143] composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.
[144]
[145] Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth--that I had no idea of
[146] rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task.
[147] But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about
[148] the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had
[149] intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.' The same dream came
[150] to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying
[151] the same or nearly the same words: 'Cultivate and make music,' said the
[152] dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort
[153] and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of
[154] my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do
[155] what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is
[156] bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not
[157] certain of this, for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense
[158] of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me
[159] a respite, I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple,
[160] and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed.
[161] And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and then
[162] considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put
[163] together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I
[164] took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew--they
[165] were the first I came upon--and turned them into verse. Tell this to
[166] Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come
[167] after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to
[168] be going, for the Athenians say that I must.
[169]
[170] Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent
[171] companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never
[172] take your advice unless he is obliged.
[173]
[174] Why, said Socrates,--is not Evenus a philosopher?
[175]
[176] I think that he is, said Simmias.
[177]
[178] Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to
[179] die, but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful.
[180]
[181] Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the
[182] ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.
[183]
[184] Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life,
[185] but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?
[186]
[187] Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples
[188] of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?
[189]
[190] Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates.
[191]
[192] My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not
[193] repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, it
[194] is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the
[195] pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval
[196] between this and the setting of the sun?
[197]
[198] Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have
[199] certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm when
[200] he was staying with us at Thebes: and there are others who say the same,
[201] although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.
[202]
[203] Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will
[204] understand. I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are
[205] evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be
[206] the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted
[207] to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.
[208]
[209] Very true, said Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native Boeotian.
[210]
[211] I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may
[212] not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in
[213] secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run
[214] away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too
[215] believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of
[216] theirs. Do you not agree?
[217]
[218] Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes.
[219]
[220] And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the
[221] liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation
[222] of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would
[223] you not punish him if you could?
[224]
[225] Certainly, replied Cebes.
[226]
[227] Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a
[228] man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is
[229] now summoning me.
[230]
[231] Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say. And
[232] yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our
[233] guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which we were
[234] just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be
[235] willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the
[236] best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man thinks that when
[237] set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of
[238] him. A fool may perhaps think so--he may argue that he had better run away
[239] from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and
[240] not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his
[241] running away. The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better
[242] than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now
[243] said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at
[244] passing out of life.
[245]
[246] The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, turning
[247] to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not so easily convinced by
[248] the first thing which he hears.
[249]
[250] And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does
[251] appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly
[252] wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than
[253] himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks
[254] that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom
[255] you acknowledge to be our good masters.
[256]
[257] Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say. And so you think
[258] that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?
[259]
[260] We should like you to do so, said Simmias.
[261]
[262] Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did
[263] when before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes,
[264] that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first
[265] place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as
[266] certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so
[267] sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind;
[268] and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope
[269] that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of
[270] old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.
[271]
[272] But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said
[273] Simmias. Will you not impart them to us?--for they are a benefit in which
[274] we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us,
[275] that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.
[276]
[277] I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what
[278] Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me.
[279]
[280] Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:--the attendant who is to give you the
[281] poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not
[282] to talk much, talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to
[283] interfere with the action of the poison; persons who excite themselves are
[284] sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.
[285]
[286] Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the
[287] poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all.
[288]
[289] I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged to
[290] satisfy him.
[291]
[292] Never mind him, he said.
[293]
[294] And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher
[295] has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after
[296] death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how
[297] this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem
[298] that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other
[299] men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and
[300] if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why
[301] when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always
[302] pursuing and desiring?
[303]
[304] Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me
[305] laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear
[306] your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our
[307] people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is
[308] in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the
[309] death which they desire.
[310]
[311] And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the
[312] words 'they have found them out'; for they have not found out either what
[313] is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he
[314] deserves or desires death. But enough of them:--let us discuss the matter
[315] among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?
[316]
[317] To be sure, replied Simmias.
[318]
[319] Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the
[320] completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from
[321] the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death?
[322]
[323] Just so, he replied.
[324]
[325] There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present
[326] inquiry if you and I can agree about it:--Ought the philosopher to care
[327] about the pleasures--if they are to be called pleasures--of eating and
[328] drinking?
[329]
[330] Certainly not, answered Simmias.
[331]
[332] And what about the pleasures of love--should he care for them?
[333]
[334] By no means.
[335]
[336] And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for
[337] example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments
[338] of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise
[339] anything more than nature needs? What do you say?
[340]
[341] I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.
[342]
[343] Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with
[344] the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and
[345] to turn to the soul.
[346]
[347] Quite true.
[348]
[349] In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed
[350] in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body.
[351]
[352] Very true.
[353]
[354] Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has
[355] no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth
[356] having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.
[357]
[358] That is also true.
[359]
[360] What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?--is the
[361] body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean
[362] to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the
[363] poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they
[364] are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?--for
[365] you will allow that they are the best of them?
[366]
[367] Certainly, he replied.
[368]
[369] Then when does the soul attain truth?--for in attempting to consider
[370] anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.
[371]
[372] True.
[373]
[374] Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?
[375]
[376] Yes.
[377]
[378] And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of
[379] these things trouble her--neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any
[380] pleasure,--when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible
[381] to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring
[382] after true being?
[383]
[384] Certainly.
[385]
[386] And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from
[387] his body and desires to be alone and by herself?
[388]
[389] That is true.
[390]
[391] Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an
[392] absolute justice?
[393]
[394] Assuredly there is.
[395]
[396] And an absolute beauty and absolute good?
[397]
[398] Of course.
[399]
[400] But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?
[401]
[402] Certainly not.
[403]
[404] Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?--and I speak not of
[405] these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of
[406] the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever
[407] been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the
[408] nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who
[409] so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of
[410] the essence of each thing which he considers?
[411]
[412] Certainly.
[413]
[414] And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the
[415] mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any
[416] other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in
[417] her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid,
[418] as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body,
[419] these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the
[420] soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge--who, if not he, is
[421] likely to attain the knowledge of true being?
[422]
[423] What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias.
[424]
[425] And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led
[426] to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the
[427] following? 'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought which
[428] seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in
[429] the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our
[430] desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body
[431] is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of
[432] food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the
[433] search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears,
[434] and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say,
[435] takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and
[436] fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the
[437] body? wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be
[438] acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all
[439] these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and
[440] worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some
[441] speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and
[442] confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from
[443] seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would
[444] have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body--the soul in
[445] herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the
[446] wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, not while
[447] we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul
[448] cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows--either knowledge is
[449] not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not
[450] till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself
[451] alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to
[452] knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the
[453] body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure
[454] until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having
[455] got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse
[456] with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is
[457] no other than the light of truth.' For the impure are not permitted to
[458] approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true
[459] lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You
[460] would agree; would you not?
[461]
[462] Undoubtedly, Socrates.
[463]
[464] But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that,
[465] going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall
[466] attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on
[467] my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his
[468] mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.
[469]
[470] Certainly, replied Simmias.
[471]
[472] And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I
[473] was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself
[474] into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place
[475] alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;--the release
[476] of the soul from the chains of the body?
[477]
[478] Very true, he said.
[479]
[480] And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?
[481]
[482] To be sure, he said.
[483]
[484] And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the
[485] soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their
[486] especial study?
[487]
[488] That is true.
[489]
[490] And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in
[491] men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet
[492] repining when it comes upon them.
[493]
[494] Clearly.
[495]
[496] And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of
[497] dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at
[498] the matter thus:--if they have been in every way the enemies of the body,
[499] and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is
[500] granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined,
[501] instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they
[502] arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired--and this was
[503] wisdom--and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many
[504] a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of
[505] seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them.
[506] And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in
[507] like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still
[508] repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my
[509] friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction
[510] that there and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this
[511] be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of
[512] death.
[513]
[514] He would, indeed, replied Simmias.
[515]
[516] And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his
[517] reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover
[518] of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or
[519] power, or both?
[520]
[521] Quite so, he replied.
[522]
[523] And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of
[524] the philosopher?
[525]
[526] Certainly.
[527]
[528] There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist
[529] in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of
[530] superiority to them--is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who
[531] despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?
[532]
[533] Most assuredly.
[534]
[535] For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are
[536] really a contradiction.
[537]
[538] How so?
[539]
[540] Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men